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13.1  Introduction 
The issue of resource transfers among families and across generations 
has stimulated much concern among economists in recent years. Intergen- 
erational and interfamily transfers have been investigated in a variety of 
contexts. One important line of research has been concerned with the con- 
nection between bequests and inequality in earnings or lifetime wealth. 
Menchik (1980) finds that bequests are equally shared among family mem- 
bers. In contrast, using a different data set, Tomes (1981) finds evidence 
that bequests perform a compensatory role; ceteris paribus, inheritances 
received tend to be inversely related to income. Though the bequest mo- 
tive appears to be strong for those in upper-income strata (Menchik and 
David 1983), the scope for significant redistribution of economic welfare 
through bequests for the majority of individuals is limited, since the aver- 
age inheritance received is small (Blinder 1973; Menchik 1980). 
Another mechanism for income redistribution is inter vivos transfers. 
Because of data limitations, however, these transfers have received less at- 
tention in the literature compared to bequests. Parsons (1975) analyzes 
the connection between parental characteristics and schooling behavior 
but did not have access to direct measures of family support for students. 
Adams (1980) explores a similar problem and is forced to use educational 
attainment as a proxy for inter vivos transfers received. Lampman and 
Smeeding (1982), using fragmentary data culled from a variety of sources, 
investigate trends in interfamily transfers, finding evidence of a declining 
trend in such transfers relative to government transfers over the past thirty 
years. 
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In this chapter we investigate a new data set that contains information 
for a variety of inter vivos transfers as well as bequests. We focus primar- 
ily on an analysis of inter vivos transfer behavior. The chapter is divided 
into three sections. In the first section, a descriptive overview of the inter- 
family transfer data is presented. In the second section, a life-cycle model 
of interfamily transfers is developed to  analyze inter vivos transfer behav- 
ior among families. In the final section some implications of the model are 
tested using the interfamily transfer data. 
13.1.1  Interfamily Transfers-A  Descriptive Overview 
Data for intergenerational transfers come from the President’s Com- 
mission on Pension Policy (PCPP)-Household  Survey. The main objec- 
tive of  the commission was to obtain information about retirement in- 
come and the effects of retirement income on saving. The data set contains 
information about the components of  household balance sheets, income 
from various sources, pension information, and demographic data. In ad- 
dition, survey respondents were asked to report on various types of inter- 
family transfers. (Kurz 1984 complements this study.) 
The PCPP survey obtained data for 4,605 families. The sample was de- 
signed to  be a representative cross-section of the U.S. population. (See the 
appendix for more information about respondent selection.) The survey 
information used in this paper was collected in August  1979, generally 
covering the first eight months of that year. 
Information about interfamily transfers was gathered in the following 
way.  Respondents were asked if they received any contributions toward 
their expenses from anyone outside of their immediate family. The imme- 
diate family is defined as parents and any children under the age of eigh- 
teen living at the same address. Survey respondents are the heads of each 
family unit, where the head of each family unit is defined as the individual 
most familiar with family finances. Respondents aged eighteen and over 
who are living at the same address were treated as separate family units. 
The respondents were first asked to report any payments received in the 
past month for mortgages, utility bills, property taxes or property insur- 
ance, or food. The families were then asked to report on an additional set 
of transfers  received  from January  1979 through  August  1979. These 
transfers included: bill payments (such as medical or legal fees) not re- 
ported in the monthly categories above; contributions toward the pur- 
chase of  durable goods; transfers for education; trust funds; stocks and 
bonds; gifts of durable goods or property; the value of use of goods or 
property; cash; inheritances; and miscellaneous transfers received. Then 
the respondents were asked to report any transfers given to individuals 
outside the immediate family unit  from January  1979 through August 
1979. The categories for transfers given match the categories for eight- 
month transfers received (except that no information was obtained for be- 395  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
quests given). For the “monthly” items, however (i.e.,  mortgages, utili- 
ties, taxes and insurance, and food), households were only asked to report 
receipts and not transfers given. (A facsimile of the type of question deal- 
ing with interfamily transfers is presented in the appendix.) 
Further, survey respondents were asked to identify the source of trans- 
fers received and the recipient of transfers given according to generation. 
Transfers received were classified according to three different family gen- 
erations: older, younger, and equal. Transfers received from friends were 
put into the “equal” category. Transfers given were classified in the same 
way as transfers received. 
The interfamily transfer data offer a unique opportunity to examine 
many different types of private transfers between family units, but the 
data are limited in a variety of ways. First, about a quarter of all house- 
holds surveyed contained more than one family unit, and there are many 
implicit transfers that could take place in shared living arrangements that 
would not be picked up in the interfamily transfer data. Members of two- 
family units living under the same roof could exchange a variety of ser- 
vices, such as home production activities (e.g., housework, baby-sitting, 
and running errands). Second, transfers to individuals under the age of 
eighteen are not recorded in the survey, because the survey only considers 
transfers among adults (those aged eighteen and over). Third, since only 
transfers between family units are counted,  interspousal transfers are 
omitted from the analysis below. 
The survey also contains a variety of information about assets, property 
income, income from government transfers, and earnings. Household 
balance sheet components are broken down according to a variety of 
types of assets (e.g., value of savings deposits, jewelry) and different types 
of liabilities (e.g., mortgage debt, debts owed to other families). The sur- 
vey contains data for nonlabor income from many different sources (e.g., 
food stamps, private pensions, stock dividends). Families were asked to 
report earnings for the first eight months of 1979, weekly hours worked, 
and other work-related information such as years of employment. The 
PCPP survey contains a variety of demographic data including number of 
children, marital status, and education. 
Of the 4,605  families surveyed, 727 (15.8  percent) reported that they 
gave one or more transfers to other family units during the first eight 
months of  1979 (see table 13.1).’  The number of households receiving a 
transfer during that period was 840 (18.4 percent). There were 472 monthly 
transfers received (for food, mortgages, insurance, and utilities) and 610 
1. The actual number of family units that reported giving transfers was 728. One of the 
givers reported giving an extremely large cash gift (over $200,000),  and the value of this gift 
appeared  inconsistent  with the related earnings and asset information for this case. This out- 
lier was removed from the sample. 396  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
Bble 13.1  Families Giving and Receiving One or More Interfamily Transfers 
Proportion of Sample 
Number  (N = 4,605) 
Families giving  727 
Families receiving  840 
1.  Monthly  472 
2.  Eight-month period  610 
3.  Both (1) and (2)  24 1 
Families both giving and 







transfers received for bills, education, gifts, etc., during the first eight 
months of 1979. 
The distribution of interfamily transfers is highly skewed (table 13.2). 
Among households giving transfers, those in the ninetieth percentile and 
above-in  terms of the size of the transfer given-account  for over half of 
all transfer dollars given. Among households receiving transfers, the size 
distribution of transfers is also highly unequal. The distribution pattern 
for transfers received is similar to that of transfers given. 
The distribution of transfers given by type of transfer is presented in ta- 
ble 13.3.*  The largest category in terms of total transfer dollars is transfers 
given for the payment of bills (25.4 percent). Bills could include payments 
for a variety of expenditures such as medical care or food, but a further 
breakdown of this category is not available in the data set. Expenditures 
for college education account for 16.8 percent of all transfer dollars, and 
the average transfer amount among givers (annualized) is $2,292. Note 
that the transfer categories in table 13.3 cover both investment-related ex- 
penditures (e.g., education, durables) and consumption goods (e.g., use 
of property). 
The types of transfers received in the first eight months of  1979 are pre- 
sented in table 13.4, and monthly transfers received are presented in table 
13.5. The items in table 13.4 for transfers received match those in table 
13.3 for transfers given, except that table 13.4 includes bequests and the 
types of bills reported in tables 13.3 and 13.4 do not match.'  The largest 
component of total transfers received is bequests, but bequests in dollar 
terms account for only a quarter of all transfers received. The data in table 
13.4 indicate that most of the interfamily income redistribution occurs 
through inter vivos transfers, rather than through bequests. 
2.  The transfer amounts reported in tables 13.3 and 13.4 are annualized figures. Because 
the eight-month survey period excludes the holiday season, however, the annualized figures 
may not reflect true annual figures for certain transfer categories, such as cash gifts. 
3.  In table 13.3 households were asked to report all transfers given for the payment of 
bills. In table 13.4 households were asked to report receipts of transfers for the payment of 
bills except for those covered under the monthly categories, which were reported separately. 397  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 





95th and above 





































Table 13.3  Distribution of Transfer Dollars, by Type of Transfer Given 
(annualized figures, 1979 dollars) 
~~  ~~ 
Proportion  Average 
Giving  Transfer Amount  Distribution of 
Transfer Category  Transfers  per Giver  Transfer Dollars 
1.  Bill payments 
2.  Durables 
3.  College education 
4.  Trust funds 
5.  Securities 
6.  Durables (in kind) 
7.  Use of property 
8.  Cash 
9.  Other 
TOTAL 
6.2% 





























Table U.4  Distribution of Transfer Dollars, by Type of Transfer Received 
(annualized figures, 1979 dollars) 
Proportion  Average 
Receiving  Transfer Amount  Distribution of 
Transfer  per Recipient  Transfer Dollars 
1.  Bill payments 
2.  Durables 
3.  College education 
4.  Trust funds 
5.  Securities 
6.  Durables (in kind) 
7.  Use of property 
8.  Cash 
9.  Inheritance 
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Bble  l3.5  Distribution of Transfer Dollars, by Type of Monthly Transfer 
Received (monthly 1979 dollars) 
Proportion 
Receiving  Average Transfer  Distribution of 
Transfer  Transfer  Amount per Recipient  Transfer Dollars 
1.  Mortgages  4.0%  $267 
2.  Utilities  3.7  62 
3.  Insurance  0.6  420 
4.  Food  7.7  163 






A comparison of  similar categories in tables 13.3 and 13.4 is useful in 
order to assess the consistency of the transfer data reported in the survey. 
There is some evidence that transfers received might be underreported rel- 
ative to transfers given. Aggregate transfer amounts from tables 13.3 and 
13.4 from transfer  categories that match (durables, college education, 
trust funds, securities, durables in kind, use of property, and cash) reveal 
that reported transfers given exceed transfers received by  11 percent.  In 
addition, the average value for durables in kind among givers is twice as 
high as the value for durables received ($2,059 versus $1,010). Givers may 
place a greater value on those transfers compared to  recipient^.^ 
The distribution of monthly transfers by type is presented in table 13.5. 
The average transfer amount among recipients was $272, and most of the 
monthly transfers received were for food. It is not possible to determine 
whether or not the monthly transfers occurred on a regular basis during 
the first eight months of 1979.5 The transfers reported in table 13.5 apply 
to August 1979. 
An interesting comparison can be made between public and private 
transfers for food. Data for the value of food stamps received are avail- 
able in the PCPP data. There were 412 family units who reported receiv- 
ing food stamps, and the average value of food stamps received for this 
group was $581 over the first eight months of 1979. Dividing by 8 yields a 
monthly average food stamp figure of $73. This figure is less than half of 
the $163 private transfer average for food (table  13.5).  It is difficult to 
compare these two figures because of differences in the time frame, how- 
ever. The private food transfer amount applies to August 1979 only, and it 
4.  The reconciling of aggregate transfers received with transfers given may be affected by 
a sampling problem, however. We do  not know whether or not students living in dormatories 
on  college campuses were sampled in the household survey. An undersampling of this group 
would cause an  underreporting of educational transfer receipts. This problem is mitigated by 
the fact that the survey took place during the month of August, when the number of students 
living in dormatories is expected to  be low compared to the fall and spring months. 
5. In table 13.2, six households (the ninty-ninth percentile and above) reported receiving 
monthly transfers of $3,000 and above, and one household reported receiving a monthly 
transfer  for mortgage payments of $15,820. These large values are likely to be lump-sum 
payments such as transfers for a down payment on a house. 399  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
Table 13.6  Transfers Received, by Student Status 
~~ 
Average 
Average  Transfer  Average 
Transfer  Received for  Transfer 
Received for  Noneducational  Received 
Recipients  Number  Education  Items“  Monthlyb 
Students  179  $2,087  $1,174  $ 92 
Nonstudents  66 1  0  1,503  169 
Notes: Student status is defined in the following way: An individual is designated as a 
student if he or she receives interfamily transfers for education. Otherwise the recipient 
is designated a nonstudent. Those designated as nonstudents may still be students (e.g., 
enrolled in public universities or scholarship recipients). The word student is used here 
as convenient shorthand for “recipient of interfamily transfers for education.” Educa- 
tional transfers received are annualized, 1979 dollars. 
aAll items in table 13.4 except item number 3 (annualized, 1979 dollars). 
bAll items in table 13.5. 
is impossible to measure private food transfers that took place in the earlier 
months of that year. Forty-two individuals in the sample received both 
food stamps and private transfers for food. 
The values of average transfers received by student status is presented 
in table 13.6. An individual is defined as a student if he or she received in- 
terfamily transfers for education. Those receiving transfers for education 
also received an average of $1,174 for other items during the first eight 
months of  1979 and an average of $92 in monthly transfers. The average 
transfer received among nonstudents is lower. Nonstudents received an 
average of  $1,503 in noneducational transfers and an average of  $169 in 
monthly transfers. 
13.1.2  Directions of Transfers 
Transfer data are available according to generation. It is possible to dis- 
tinguish among transfers given to younger, older, or same generations. 
Similarly, it is possible to distinguish among transfers received from dif- 
ferent generations. The directions of transfers are presented in table 13.7. 
The distributions show that, while most of the flow of transfers is from 
older to younger generations, a substantial number of interfamily trans- 
fers take place among households of the same generation. Measured in 
dollars, transfers given to younger generations account for almost two- 
thirds of total transfer dollars, while transfers given to members of the 
same generation account for 27 percent of total transfer dollars given. 
The flow of transfers from younger to older households is small. Such 
transfers account for 9 percent of total transfer dollars given. The break- 
down of transfers received according to direction reveals the same pat- 
tern. Almost 70 percent of all interfamily transfer income received origi- 
nated with families from an older generation.  In contrast, less than 3 Table U.7  Directions of Transfers 
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B. Transfers Received (annualized, 1979 dollars) 
Generation  Number of  Average Amount  Percentage of Total 





















C. Transfers Received (monthly) 
Generation  Number of 
Received from  Transfers Received 
Average Amount 
Percentage  of Transfer  Percentage 
Older  275  55.4  $259  55.7 
Same  157  31.7  264  32.4 
Younger  64  12.9  237  11.9 
TOTAL  496  100.0  259  100.00 401  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
Table 13.8  Transfers by Age of Fdy  Unit Head 


































percent of transfers received (measured in dollars) originated from youn- 
ger households.6 
Another way to examine the flow of transfers between generations is to 
look at the age profiles of transfers (table 13.8). The proportion giving 
transfers rises and falls with age. Among those giving transfers, the transfer- 
age profile rises over the life cycle. The proportion receiving transfers falls 
with age, but the average transfer per recipient first rises and then falls 
with age. The elderly (aged sixty-two and over) receive less transfer in- 
come than any other age bracket. 
13.1.3 
Selected characteristics of families in the sample are presented in table 
13.9 according to  transfer status. Transfer status is divided into givers, re- 
cipients,  and those who neither give nor receive transfers.  For conve- 
nience, let us denote the last group as “others.” Because 196 families both 
gave and received  a transfer,  some recipients are included among the 
givers and some givers are  included among the recipients.’ 
Earnings and asset levels among the transfer groups are ranked highest 
for givers and lowest for recipients.  Average earnings among givers is 
Characteristics of Families in the Sample 
6. The amount of transfers received from members of a younger generation is less than 
half of the amount given to members of an older generation. This discrepancy may result 
from reporting bias. Older households may have been reluctant in some cases to report in- 
come received from younger families. 
7. If families are divided according to net transfer status-that  is, transfers given net of 
transfers received being positive, negative, or zero-the  characteristics of the families in 
these groups are similar to  the figures reported in table 13.9. 402  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
Table 13.9  Selected Chnracteristics of Families by  Interfamily Transfer Status 
Nongivers and 
;;  Givers  Recipients  Nonrecipients 
Age  41.1  32.8  42.6 
Percent married, spouse present  59.7  26.2  49.0 
Percent with children 
Years of schooling  12.9  12.8  11.8 
Years of schooling, spouse  12.5  12.7  11.7 
Percent multiearner  38.2  15.0  24.5 
Percent female headed  31.0  50.7  37.9 
Earnings  32,067  16,816  19,976 
Percent with earnings  89.8  84.5  70.0 
Financial income  2,216  900  980 
Percent with financial income  72.5  59.2  48.9 
Retirement income  1,145  625  1,180 
Percent with retirement income  17.2  16.2  23.4 
Public transfer income’  434  697  561 
aged 18 or under  40.9  27.0  35.9 
Percent with public transfer 
Value of financial assets 
Value of tangible assets 
Value of expected inheritance 
Mortgage debt, home 
Mortgage debt, other properties 
Debts owed to other families 
N 
























~~  ~ 
“Includes income from private disability plans, alimony, and child support. 
twice as high as average earnings among recipients. The average value of 
assets among givers (financial plus tangible wealth) is almost three times 
as high for givers compared to recipients, and the average value of  assets 
for givers is almost double that of “others.” Average income among “oth- 
ers” is higher than that of recipients, although a larger proportion of re- 
cipients have positive earnings (84 percent versus 70 percent). A greater 
proportion of “others” are retired compared to either of the other two 
groups. The proportion receiving public transfer income is highest among 
recipients and lowest among givers. 
Recipients tend to be younger than other households,  and relatively 
fewer of  them are married. Average education levels for both recipients 
and givers, however, are higher compared to “others.”  In addition, the 
average value of expected inheritance reported among givers and recipi- 
ents was three times higher compared to that reported among “others.” 
13.1.4  Transfers and Relative Income Inequality 
Table 13.9 shows that average income is higher among households that 
give transfers compared to nongivers/nonrecipients,  and that the average 403  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
able  13.10  Income Inequality before and after Transfers 
Sample 
1979 Income Inequalitya 
Labor Income  Total Incomeb  N 
1.  Givers  pretransfer 
2.  Recipients  pretransfer 
3.  (1) and (2)  pretransfer 

























'Income inequality is measured by the variance of  the natural logarithm of  income. 
bTotal  income is equal to labor income plus financial  income, government transfer income, 
retirement income, plus the rental value of owner-occupied housing, minus federal, state, 
and local taxes. 
'The  sample is restricted to those families with $100 or more in labor earnings. If  the 
sample is expanded to include those with less than $100 in labor earnings, the qualitative 
results reported in table 13.9 are still obtained but the absolute changes in variances are 
larger. 
income of households that receive transfers is lower than either of these 
groups. The next issue to  be explored is the effects of interfamily transfers 
on  the distribution of income. 
The measure of relative income inequality used here is the variance of 
the natural logarithm of  income. Inequality measures for different sub- 
samples are given in table 13.10. Two  measures of income are used. The 
first is labor income. The second is total income, which includes financial 
income, income from government and other transfer programs, retire- 
ment income, and imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing,8 
and subtracts federal, state, and local taxes. Posttransfer income is de- 
fined as income minus transfers given plus transfers received. An income 
flow was imputed from bequests re~eived.~  The sample is restricted to 
those families having $100 or more in labor earnings. 
Measured relative inequality declines when net interfamily transfers are 
added to income. For all households in the sample in table 13.10, the vari- 
8.  The income flow from owner-occupied housing is calculated by multiplying the value 
of housing in  1979 dollars by the ratio of aggregate rental income to the aggregate value of 
the U.S.  housing stock (3.94 percent). Data are from the Washington  University Mucroecon- 
ometric Model of the US.  Economy 1984. 
9.  The income from bequests was calculated by multiplying the bequest amount by the 
average nominal rate of return from financial assets in  1979 (7.54 percent). The average rate 
of  return was calculated by dividing aggregate U.S. income flows from financial assets by 
the value of the aggregate U.S. stock of financial assets (Washington University Mucroecon- 
ometric Model of the U.S.  Economy 1984). No attempt was made to impute income flows 
from other transfers, although possibly some other transfers (such as gifts of  durables) 
would be more appropriately treated as additions to the stock of wealth as opposed to in- 
come flows. 404  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
ance of the log of total income falls from .55 to .51 after interfamily trans- 
fers are taken into account. The decline in measured income inequality for 
the entire sample of earners is small, but for certain subgroups the nar- 
rowing of  relative income inequality due to transfers is larger. For the 
group of recipients, for example, the variance of the log of labor income 
declines from 0.70 to 0.49  after  net  interfamily transfers  are added. 
Among recipients the expanded measure of total income (which includes 
government transfer payments and subtracts taxes) is distributed more 
equally compared to labor income (with variances of 0.60 and 0.70 respec- 
tively). Once interfamily transfers are taken into account, measured in- 
come dispersion declines further to 0.47. These calculations suggest that 
both government tax and transfer programs and interfamily transfers 
play a role in narrowing relative income inequality. 
13.2  A Life-Cycle Model of Intergenerational Transfers 
The model to be presented is aimed at capturing the basic dynamics of 
life-cycle transfers across generations or across families within genera- 
tions where altruism exists. The model assumes no uncertainty, and be- 
quests are assumed to be zero (all transfers are inter vivos). The model 
also makes no distinction between transfers that subsidize consumption 
of the recipients and those that reflect human capital investments. 
The model assumes a pattern of  overlapping generations as follows. 
Each representative person in the model proceeds through two distinct 
life-cycle phases of length L-the  “child” phase followed by the “parent” 
phase. The child phase ends when the parent dies and a new child is born; 
these two events occur simultaneously. Thus, a lifetime lasts for 2L years 
and successive generations overlap for L years. The key distinction be- 
tween the child and the parent generations is that the child is assumed to 
be liquidity constrained whereas the parent is not. The child’s current con- 
sumption in each time period is constrained to equal the sum of own earn- 
ings and transfers received from the parents. The parent, on the other 
hand, has access to  capital markets. Altruism is introduced into the model 
by assuming that parent and child seek to maximize the time preference 
discounted value of joint utility over the L years in which the two genera- 
tions overlap. 
The basic model may be stated formally as follows: Indexing child vari- 
ables by 1 and parent variables by 2, joint utility in year t,  U(t),  is assumed 
to equal the weighted sum of the logs of consumption of the child and the 
parent, C@) and C&)  respectively. 
(1)  U(t)  = Oln(Cl(t) ) + WCdt) 1, 
where /3  is a nonnegative parameter reflecting the weight given to con- 
sumption of the child relative to  that of the parent. The budget constraint 
facing the child is given by 405  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
(2) 
while that confronting the parent is 
(3) 
Ei(t) + T(t)  = Ci(t), 
k = rA(t) + Ez(t) - T(t) -  Cz(t), 
where E denotes earnings, T denotes net transfers received from the par- 
ent, A(t)  is the stock of the parent's earning assets (the dot over A denotes 
the time derivative of A), and r is the rate of interest. Maximizing the pres- 
ent value of utility over the L-year generational horizon, subject to the 
constraints posed by equations (2) and (3), then involves finding the opti- 
mal solution values for the following Hamiltonian function: 
(4)  H = [plnCl(t) + lnC~(t)]e-~* 
+ Xi(t)[Ei(t)  + T(t) - Ci(t)] 
+ hz(t)[rA(t)  + K(t) - T(t) - C2(t)l, 
where p denotes the subjective rate-of-time discount, and earnings of both 
child and parent are assumed exogenously  determined. 
The assumption that bequests from the parent to the child equal zero 
implies that the parent exhausts all assets accumulated over the L adult 
years in which the liquidity constraint is not binding. Alternatively,  the as- 
set exhaustion condition states that the discounted value of parent con- 
sumption plus the discounted value of net transfers equal the discounted 
value of adult earnings over the L-year horizon: 
(5) 
L  L  L  1  Cz(t)e-Rdt  + j T(t)e-"*dt  = j B(t)e-'*dt. 
0  0  0 
The assumption of exogenously determined earnings for both parent 
and child plus the asset exhaustion condition mean that the control prob- 
lem posed by equation (4) reduces to solving for the optimal time path of 
two control variables: parent's consumption and net transfers. First-order 
conditions for the solution of the Hamiltonian reveal what is intuitively 
clear; net transfers are adjusted over time so as to maintain a proportional 
relationship between consumption by the child and consumption by the 
parent, as follows: 
(6)  Cdt) = PC2(t). 
Equation (6) defines the essence of altruism in the present model. It 
does not depend on the particular time paths of (exogenous) parent and 
child earnings. It implies that intergenerational transfers will increase in- 
come and consumption equality across generations so long as p is closer to 
1.0 than the ratio of El to E2. To solve for the precise time path of net 
transfers, it is necessary to specify the time paths of child and parent earn- 
ings. We assume that these grow at constant rates gI  and g2 respectively: 
El(t) = El(0)egl'. 
EZ(t) = Ez(0)egAL 
+
 ". 406  Donald Cox/fiedric Raines 
Defining WI  and W2  as the present value of these earnings streams, 
W;  =  E;(t)e-rfd,,,  i = 1,2. 
0  f 
The expression for net transfers can be written as follows: 
(9) 
Equation (9) implies the following partial derivative effects on transfers: 
The sign below each of the arguments in equation (10) represents the sign 
of the partial derivative of transfers with respect to that argument. 
Some discussion of the above results is in order. First, note that equa- 
tion (9) suggests that transfers from the older (parent) generation to the 
younger (child) generation will typically be positive; they can only become 
negative (i.e., transfers go on balance from the child to the parent) if child 
earnings are relatively large and joint utility favors parent consumption (a 
low value for 0). This result can be seen from expression (10) in which the 
current level of child earnings, El,  is inversely related to the level of cur- 
rent transfers while the weighting parameter, 0, is positively related to  the 
level of transfers. Also clear is the positive influence of parent’s wealth, 
W2,  on transfers to the child. Less obvious is the result seen in expressions 
(9) and (10) that the present discounted value of child’s wealth,  WI,  also 
increases transfers. This result becomes plausible when it is recognized 
that child’s earnings are held constant and that the child is liquidity con- 
strained. In such a circumstance any factor that produces a higher level of 
child’s wealth, other than a higher level of  current income for the child, 
can only lead to greater consumption if transfers increase. What is inter- 
esting in the present model is the unambiguous nature of this prediction. 
The influence of  the passage of time on transfers (holding EI  constant) 
depends upon the values of p and r. A rate-of-time preference greater than 
the interest rate leads to reduced transfers over time, while a relatively low 
discount rate produces the opposite result. 
The influence of increases in earnings growth rates on wealth is posi- 
tive, while a rise in the rate of interest causes a decline in wealth. Through 
wealth effects, then, a rise in the rate of interest is associated with a decline 
in transfers. Holding wealth levels constant, a rise in the rate of interest 
implies  steeper  consumption  profiles  and  therefore  higher  transfers 
(equation 10). A rise in the subjective rate-of-time preference could either 
raise or lower the level of transfers. Ignoring the finite life correction (L = 
+ m ), from equation (9), the effect of a change in the rate-of-time prefer- 
ence on transfers is given by 407  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
aT  -  @  [W,  + W,]e"-  P)'(l -  pt). 
ap  l+P 
The effect of a rise in the subjective rate-of-time preference is positive if pt 
c  1, and negative if  pt > 1. An increase in the subjective rate-of-time 
preference tilts the time profile of  consumption (and therefore transfers) 
towards greater levels of consumption early in the life cycle and smaller 
levels of consumption later on in the life cycle. 
Note that in this model the weighting parameter for child's consump- 
tion is assumed to be constant over time. If, instead, this parameter were 
to vary over time, the transfer profile would vary accordingly. A plausible 
generalization  would be an increasing time profile as children become 
more efficient in consuming relative to parents over time. This modifica- 
tion would steepen the time profile of transfers. 
Finally, while the above model poses the problem of transfers from 
older to younger generations, it can be applied to interfamily transfers 
among members of the same generation. The only behavioral assump- 
tions that are necessary are (1) that altruism exists among families and (2) 
that one family is liquidity constrained and the other is not. 
Although fairly simple in its structure, the model presented above pro- 
vides a number of  unambiguous predictions concerning the life-cycle de- 
terminants of interfamily transfers. 
13.3  Empirical Implementation 
13.3.1  Organization of the Data 
The PCPP survey data will be used to test some implications of the in- 
terfamily transfer model. There are three types of observations in the data 
set. The first is the household, which is defined as a group of persons liv- 
ing at the same address. The 1979 survey covered 3,440 households. The 
households were then broken down into 4,605 family units. A family unit 
contains a head, his or her spouse, and children under the age of eighteen 
who live at home. All other individuals were considered as members of 
separate family units. Suppose, for example, a household is made up of a 
husband, wife, two children aged sixteen and twenty-one, and a grandpar- 
ent. This household would be recorded as three separate family units: a 
primary family unit consisting of the husband, wife, and sixteen-year-old 
child, and two secondary units (the twenty-one-year-old and the grand- 
parent). A household consisting of two unrelated individuals would be di- 
vided into two family units. The third unit of observation is the person. 
Demographic and work-related information was collected for each person 
age eighteen or over. In the above example, the primary family unit would 
consist of two persons, the husband and wife. 408  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
The structure of the data set is summarized below: 
Households  3,440 
Multifamily-unit households  846 
Single-family-unit households  2,594 
Family units  4,605 
Primary family units  3,440 
Secondary family units  1,165 
Persons  6,578 
The basic unit of observation used in the estimations below is the family 
unit. An interfamily transfer takes place if  income or gifts in kind are 
transferred from one family unit to another. Thus, for example, a cash 
transfer from father to  twenty-year-old son living at the same address, for 
example, would be recorded as an interfamily transfer. Transfers given by 
one family unit to an individual outside the sample or received from an in- 
dividual  outside the sample would also be recorded  as an interfamily 
transfer. 
For those family units that are sharing a residence with other family 
units, there may be many transfers in kind that will not be recorded as in- 
terfamily transfers. Respondents were asked to report the value of free us- 
age of goods-property  or services received from or given to other family 
units-but  it is unclear whether the typical respondent would include the 
rental value of  housing in a shared living arrangement as “use of property” 
because respondents were not explicitly asked about housing. Similarly, 
respondents were asked to report cash contributions toward food con- 
sumed, but not the value of meals given or received. 
It is not possible, in general, to determine the exact source of a transfer 
received or the exact destination of  transfers given. Individuals giving 
transfers were asked only to identify the generation of the recipient, and 
all recipients were asked only to identify the generation of the giver. Sec- 
ondary family units can be matched to their primary counterparts to con- 
struct complete households, but a matching of sources and destinations of 
transfers is not possible. 
Despite the lack of information about sources and destinations of inter- 
family transfers, some evidence shows that much of the interfamify  trans- 
fers reported might also be intrahousehofd transfers. Those households 
containing more than one-family units (multifamily-unit households) rep- 
resent 25 percent of  all households in the sample (846 of the 3,440 house- 
holds). These multifamily-unit households account for 53 percent of the 
dollar amount of total transfer dollars reported given and 61 percent of 
total transfer dollars received.’O 
10. These percentages were calculated in the following way: Transfer dollars reported given, 
aggregated over all family units in the PCPP survey, amounted to $1,008,927 (not annual- 
ized), Transfer dollars given, aggregated over all family units that belong to multifamily-unit 
households equaled $532,196 (not annualized). The latter aggregate is 53 percent of the for- 
mer. The aggregate for transfers received among all family units in the sample is $902,233 
(not annualized, and monthly transfer amounts are added to eight-month items). The equiv- 409  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
13.3.2  Interfamily Transfers 
First, the behavior of all givers and all recipients will be analyzed sepa- 
rately. Then, results from a matched subsample of secondary and primary 
family units will be presented. The matched subsample will be examined 
in order to determine whether characteristics of primary family units are 
associated with transfers received by secondary units. Definitions of var- 
iables that will be used in the estimations are given in table 13.1 1. 
The theoretical section above relates transfers to the lifetime wealth of 
givers and recipients and the income of recipients. The empirical specifi- 
cation below suffers from two limitations, which preclude the estimation 
of a transfer function that is precisely analogous to that derived in the 
model. First, donors and recipients of transfers cannot be matched. Sec- 
ond, since cross-sectional data are used, the lifetime wealth of individuals 
in the file cannot be measured. Instead, components of a family unit's bal- 
ance sheet are used as indicators of the wealth of the family unit. Educa- 
tion levels should also be correlated with lifetime wealth. 
Both the giver and recipient equations are represented as Tobit mod- 
els. '' For givers the dependent variable is equal to gross transfers given 
(TRAN).  In equation (12) the variable TRANis equal to zero for all ob- 
servations for which a transfer was not given. Among the 4,605 family 
units,  727  gave interfamily transfers. The Tobit equation for givers is 
specified as follows: 
(12)  TRAN = a0  + a1  HEDUC + a2  SPEDUC + a3  AGE 
+ a4  (AGE)2  + as  FEMALE + as  KIDS 
+ a7MARRIED + asDUAL + as INCOME 
+ aloFINC + all  RETINC + a12 WELFINC 
+ a13  FINASST + a14  TANASST 
+ als  INHEREXP + a16  MORTDEBT 
+ aI7  DEBTTO + alaMORTOTHR -  uI 
= d  -  UI,  ifd-  uI > 0, 
if ax  -  u1 I  0.  TRAN = 0, 
alent figure for all family units that belong to multiunit households is $552,993. The latter 
figure is 62 percent of the former. 
11. The Tobit model can be considered as a restricted version of a more general model in 
which the decision to give a transfer and the transfer amount are determined separately (see 
Heckman 1979). Suppose, for example, that the decision to give a transfer is determined by a 
positive value for the latent variable TI,  where 7'1 = PIXI -  UI,  and the transfer amount is 
determined by T2  = 02x2 -  u1. The Tobit specification amounts to the restriction that UI = 
u2, XI  = X2,  and 81  = P2. Alternatively, the process could be modeled as a two-stage proce- 
dure in which the decision to give is estimated by probit and the transfer amounts are esti- 
mated using Heckman's procedure for correcting censoring bias. This procedure was imple- 
mented using the same vector Xin  both the probit and the transfer equation. The instrument 
for the selection correction (inverse Mills ratio) was highly collinear with the other regressors 
in the transfer equations, resulting in unstable estimates. The two-equation model is tracta- 
ble only if certain variables are excluded from the transfer amount equation. Rather than im- 
pose these restrictions, we instead impose the restriction that 01  = 62. 410  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
Table 13.11  Definitions of  Variables 




(HEDUC)  x (AGE) 




















Years of education, head. 
Years of education, spouse. 
Age of head, age of head squared. 
Interaction between years of education of head and age of 
Interaction between years of education of  spouse and age 
Dummy variable = 1 if sex of head is female. 
Number of children under the age of eighteen in family 
Dummy variable = 1 if head is married. 
Dummy variable = 1 if  dual-earner family unit (i.e., 
positive wage rates for both head and spouse). 
Total labor income of family unit, first eight months of 
1979, measured in 1979 dollars. 
Hourly wage rate, head of the family unit, 1979. 
Hourly wage rate of spouse, 1979. 
Income from financial assets of the family unit, first eight 
months of 1979, measured in 1979 dollars. 
Public and private retirement income of the family unit, 
first eight months of 1979, measured in 1979 dollars. 
Income from government transfer payments plus private 
disability payments, alimony, and child support, first 
eight months of  1979, measured in 1979 dollars. 
Value of stock of financial assets of the family unit, 
measured in 1979 dollars. 
Value of stock of tangible assets of the family unit 
measured in 1979 dollars. 
Value of expected inheritance, undiscounted,  1979 dollars. 
Stock of outstanding mortgage debt for home, 1979 dollars. 
Stock of outstanding debts owed to other family members, 
Stock of outstanding mortgage debt for properties other 
Interfamily transfers given, first eight months of  1979, 





than hdme, 1979 dollars. 
measured in 1979 dollars. 
including monthly items, measured in 1979 dollars. Inter 
vivos transfers only. Bequests are excluded. 
Total assets; the sum of financial and tangible assets. 
The Tobit  estimates of  equation (12) are presented in table  13.12. 
Transfers given are positively related to the family unit head’s education, 
labor and retirement income, and assets. The income elasticity of trans- 
fers given, evaluated at mean argument values among givers, is 0.82. The 
elasticity of transfers given with respect to financial and tangible assets 
(evaluated at giver means) is .16 and .19 respectively. Note that the esti- 411  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
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Table  13.12 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Tobit Estimates, Transfers Given (TRAN) 
INTERCEPT  -  8880.10  -11.96 
HEDUC  198.65  5.47 
SPEDUC  -  18.88  -0.36 
AGE  69.46  2.20 
(AGE)’  -  0.56  -  1.63 
FEMALE  -  142.60  -  0.73 
KIDS  -  163.78  -  1.85 
MARRIED  -  104.56  -  0.16 
DUAL  288.48  0.96 
INCOME  0.053  7.51 
FINC  -0.028  -  1.45 
RETINC  0.057  2.00 
WELFINC  -  0.072  -  0.92 
FINASST  0.0077  5.47 
TANASST  0.0045  4.56 
INHEREXP  0.0035  2.70 
MORTDEBT  -0.0139  -2.13 
DEBTTO  0.0515  2.01 
MORTOTHR  -0.0101  -  1.29 
Limits  3878 
Nonlimits  727 
In L  -  8029 
mated coefficient for financial income is negative and significant at the 
margin of the .  10 level. At reasonable values for the rate of return on fi- 
nancial assets the estimated net impact of an increase in financial wealth is 
positive, but a higher rate of return on financial assets is associated with a 
decrease in transfers given. The effect of  an increase in expected inheri- 
tance (INHEREXP) on transfers given is positive, but the elasticity of 
transfers given with respect to INHEREXP evaluated among givers is 
small. A 10 percent increase in ZNHEREXP is associated with a 0.3 per- 
cent increase in transfers given. The two liability measures, MORTDEBT 
and MORTOTHR, enter the Tobit equation with negative signs, and the 
coefficient for MORTDEBTis significant at the .05 level. The positive co- 
efficient for DEBTTO-the  stock of outstanding debt owed to other fam- 
ily members-suggests  that some of  the transfers given might be repay- 
ments for past transfers received. 
Gross transfers given increase at a decreasing rate over most of the life 
cycle. The difference, for example, between predicted transfers given at 
age fifty and transfers given at age forty is $191. The age profile of trans- 
fers given peaks at age sixty-two. Beyond age sixty-two the effect of age 
on transfers given is negative. The age variable captures the effects of 
some important omitted variables in the transfer equation. None of the 
characteristics  of  recipients or potential recipients are included in the 412  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
equation for transfers given. The estimated age profile of transfers sug- 
gests that as households age, the scope for giving continually widens until 
the family unit head approaches retirement age. 
The level of education of the head of the family unit is an important de- 
terminant of transfers. An additional year of education for the head adds 
an estimated $199 to  gross transfers given. Since educational transfers are 
included among the various categories of transfers given, education in 
part may proxy the desire of more educated households to make transfers 
in the  form of  human capital investment.  Higher  levels of  education 
should in addition be associated with increased lifetime wealth, however. 
If households making educational transfers are deleted from the sample, 
education is still positively related to transfers given (estimated equation 
not reported). An additional year of  head's education raises noneduca- 
tional transfers given by $170. The education level of the spouse enters the 
transfer equation (table 13.12) with a negative sign, but is statistically in- 
significant. 
Finally, the dummy variables for marital status (MARRIED), sex of 
family unit head (FEMALE), and multiearner status (DUAL)  are each 
statistically insignificant in the estimated equation for gross transfers given. 
An increase in the number of children under age eighteen in the family 
unit is associated with a decline in transfers given to other family units. 
13.3.3  Transfers Received 
The value of all inter vivos transfers received12  is expressed as 









-  - 
bo  + bi HEDUC + b2  SPEDUC 
b3  ((HEDUC)  x (AGE) + bq  (SPEDUC) X  (AGE) 
bs  AGE 
ba  FEMALE + bi KZDS  + bs MARRIED 
b9ZNCOME + bloFZNC + bll RETZNC 
biz WELFZNC + 61s FZNASST + bl4  TANASST 
bls ZNHEREXP + blaMORTDEBT + bi7  DEBTTO 
b18MORTOTHR -  ~2 
BY -  u2,  ifpY-  u2>0, 
0,  ifOY-u~s0. 
Estimates of equation (13) are presented in the first column of table 13.13. 
Of  particular  interest  are the  coefficients for the  income  variables- 
INCOME, FZNC, RETZNC, and WELFZNC. The coefficient on labor in- 
come (INCOME)  is negative and statistically significant at the .05 level. 
The  elasticity  of  transfers  received  (evaluated  at  recipient  argument 
12.  Bequests are excluded, and transfers from the monthly categories are included along 
with those of the eight-month categories. No attempt is made to put the monthly and eight- 
month transfers on  an equivalent time scale. 413  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
able  13.13  Tobit Estimates, Transfers Received (TRANREC) 
Variable 
Noneducational Transfers 
Transfers Received  Received 
Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 





















(HEDUO  x (AGE) 
-  6207.80 
445.80 
-  7.43 
119.08 
-  0.25 
45.86 
492.32 
-  105.07 





-  O.oO04 
0.0005 
0.0023 
-  0.0075 
0.0067 
-0.0023 
-  8.94 
8.21 
2.59 
-  0.46 
3.48 
3.79 
-  1.58 
-3.50 
-  2.17 









-  1.36 
0.30 





-  0.44 
21.05 
461.49 
-  62.04 
-  1820.06 
- 





-  0.0020 
0.0006 
0.0021 
-  0.0061 
0.0085 
-0.0196 
-  6.67 
5.08 













-  1.22 
0.70 
2.47 
-  1.22 
0.44 
-  1.92 
Limits  3785  3846 
Nonlimits  840  759 
hL  -  8668  -  8002 
means) is -  .14. The estimate of the INCOME coefficient offers some 
support for the hypothesis that one of the functions of interfamily trans- 
fers is to redistribute resources towards family units with low-income lev- 
els. Taken at face value, the estimate appears to concur with the findings 
of Tomes (1981) for inheritance data. 
The estimate for the coefficient on income should be regarded with 
some caution, however. First, the variable TRANREC contains transfers 
received for education, and these transfers are used to subsidize invest- 
ment in human capital, rather than current consumption. Average earn- 
ings among those receiving transfers for education are lower than those of 
other recipients, so the negative income coefficient is in part picking up 
the relationship between proportions of time devoted to investment in hu- 
man capital and transfers received for education. Second, if transfers re- 
ceived cause an increase in the demand for leisure, then the negative coef- 
ficient for income could in part reflect work disincentives associated with 414  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
transfer receipts.”  Each of these problems is addressed in an alternative 
specification of the equation for transfers received in which (1) educational 
transfers received are subtracted from TRANREC, and (2) wage rates for 
head and spouse (HWAGE and SWAGE) are substituted for family-unit 
income. The results are reported in the second column of table 13.13. The 
coefficient for HWAGE is of anticipated sign, but is not statistically sig- 
nificant. 
A further finding associated with the connection between transfer re- 
ceipts and income is the positive signs of estimated coefficients for other 
sources of income in the transfer equation. This finding is contrary to the 
theoretical prediction of the model. The other sources of income-finan- 
cia1 income (FINC),  retirement income (RETINC), and transfer income 
from public and private sources (  WELFZNC)L4-are each positively asso- 
ciated with interfamily transfers received. One possible reason why finan- 
cial income is positively related to transfers received is that some transfers 
(e.g.,  securities, cash) would be expected to produce financial income. 
The positive coefficient for RETINC  suggests that retirement status is as- 
sociated with increases in transfers received. 
The coefficient of  WELFINC is difficult to sign a priori in this single 
equation  specification.  Though  WELFZNC  represents  current  income 
flows that the theoretical model predicts would “crowd out’’ interfamily 
transfers, the variable also acts as a surrogate for a host of other effects 
that are not measured in the data set. Eligibility for income from disability 
plans or food stamps implies that the family unit may be experiencing 
some financial distress that is not measured by other variables included in 
the equation. 
The amount of transfers received rises with education. While education 
levels can be interpreted in part as indicators of  lifetime earnings of indi- 
viduals, the relationship between education levels and transfers received is 
more complex in the estimated equations. Most importantly, educational 
transfers are included among transfers received in the first column of ta- 
ble 13.13. To deal with the problem of spurious correlation between trans- 
fers received and education levels, years of education was interacted with 
age. Further, educational transfers were deleted from transfers received in 
the equation presented in the second column of table 13.13. 
The estimates of  the effects of education on noneducational transfers 
received indicate a $1,006 difference between predicted noneducational 
transfers for a family unit headed by a thirty-year-old college graduate as 
opposed to a thirty-year-old high school graduate. The same calculation 
13. Tomes 1981 raises this issue, but finds no evidence of work  disincentive effects due to 
inheritance. 
14.  The variable  WELFINC includes AFDC and other public assistance income, food 
stamps, Supplementary Social Security Income, as well as income from private disability 
plans, alimony and child support, and other conditional transfer income. 415  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
using spouse’s education indicates a predicted difference in noneduca- 
tional transfers received of $437. 
Estimated transfers decline with age. The age effect of noneducational 
transfers evaluated at twelve years of schooling is estimated at -  $32.35 
for each additional year.I5  The dummy for marital status indicates that es- 
timated interfamily transfers received are much smaller for married indi- 
viduals.  Interfamily transfers are primarily targeted at family units in 
which the head is not married. 
Estimated transfer receipts are higher for family units headed by  fe- 
males.  Female status  raises  estimated  transfers  by  almost  $500 (table 
13.13, cols. 1 and 2). 
The influence of the asset variables (FINASST, TANASST) on trans- 
fers received is negligible; the coefficient for FINASST is of expected sign 
but not  statistically significant. Family units that  expect larger inheri- 
tances receive more inter vivos transfers. The causality may run the other 
way, however, if family units use current values of inter vivos transfers to 
gauge the expected value of their inheritance. 
In sum, the estimates offer some support  for the theoretical  model 
above. Inter vivos transfers are targeted towards young, unmarried family 
units. Controlling for other factors that influence transfers, female-headed 
family units receive higher transfer amounts. The evidence is  far from 
conclusive, however. Most importantly, the impacts of changes in wage 
rates on the level of noneducational transfers received are not statistically 
different from zero. 
13.3.4  Primary and Secondary Family Units 
A quarter of the 4,605 family units are secondary family units. Infor- 
mation for each secondary family unit can be matched with information 
from its primary counterpart. Aside from the matching aspects of the 
sample of secondary family units, these family units are different from the 
others because they are living in the same dwelling with a primary family 
unit. The purpose of  this section is twofold. First, transfers received will 
be  analyzed  in the matched  sample, where information  is  given both 
about primary and secondary units. Transfers received by secondary units 
will be expressed as a function of the characteristics of secondary units 
and the characteristics of the primary units with which they are matched. 
Second, an equation for transfers received will be estimated among the 
sample of all primary units, and this equation will be compared with the 
equation for the secondary units. 
The Tobit equations for transfers received for each family-unit type are 
presented in table 13.14. Transfers received are limited to noneducational 
15. A parabolic age profile was estimated, but the second-order term was not significantly 
different from zero. 'lhble U.14  Tobit Estimates,  Noneducational Transfers Received 
Secondary Family Units  Primary Family Units 
Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
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transfers in order to avoid the possibility of a spurious relationship be- 
tween educational transfers and recipients’ income, as noted above. The 
equations that are estimated are simplified variants of equation (13). The 
equation for transfers received among secondary units, including charac- 
teristics of their primary-unit members, is presented in columns (1) and (2) 
of table 13.14.  The variables for primary units are denoted by the suffix I? 
The variable HEDUCR for example, denotes years of education for the 
head of the primary family unit for which there is also a secondary unit 
present. 
When the sample is restricted to secondary family units, INCOME is es- 
timated to have a positive effect on transfers received. This finding is con- 
trary to the predictions of the model. Actual transfers received by individ- 
uals in the same household may include services in kind that are not 
recorded in the transfer items measured in the PCPP data. If  so, then 
there may be greater scope for mismeasurement of actual transfers re- 
ceived among secondary family units compared to  primary family units.  l6 
In columns (3) and (4) of table 13.14, transfers received by secondary 
units are estimated when characteristics of their associated primary units 
are permitted to vary. The reason for this experiment is that primary fam- 
ily units may be a source of many transfers received by their secondary 
counterparts. If this is true we can assess the possible “omitted variable 
bias” that may affect the recipient equations when characteristics of do- 
nors are not available. The estimated coefficients are similar, except that 
the coefficient for education for the secondary family unit is much larger 
when primary-unit variables are omitted from the equation. The estimated 
effects of own-education levels on transfers received in the previous sec- 
tion (table 13.13) may therefore in part be picking up the effects of do- 
nors’ education on transfers. 
The estimated equation for transfers received among primary house- 
holds is presented in columns (5) and (6) of table 13.14. There are three 
major differences between the sample of primary family units and secon- 
dary family units with respect to transfers received. First, the proportion 
of recipients among secondary family units is much larger than among 
primary family units (29 percent versus 12 percent). Second, labor income 
among primary units is inversely related to  transfers received. The elastic- 
ity of noneducational transfers received with respect to income (evaluated 
at recipient means) is equal to -  0.2, and the estimated income coefficient 
is significant at the 0.1 level. Finally, the influence of education on trans- 
fers received is larger for primary units compared to secondary units. 
The estimates of transfers received in the sample of primary family 
units tend to confirm the predictions of the theoretical model. If we inter- 
16.  In addition, a Tobit equation was estimated in which recipients were redefined as 
those receiving transfers in excess of  transfers they gave. In this specification, the effect of 
income on these net transfers received is not significantly different from zero. 418  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
pret years of education as an  indicator of lifetime wealth, the positive rela- 
tionship between transfer receipts and education combined with the in- 
verse relationship  between income and transfer receipts indicate that, 
among primary family units, interfamily transfers serve a compensatory 
function that increases with lifetime wealth. 
13.3.5  Conclusion 
In this study we have attempted to gain understanding of the disposi- 
tion of inter vivos transfers by means of data that measure a variety of 
such transfers. While the data set offers a unique opportunity to explore 
this aspect of  economic behavior, the data have significant limitations 
that need to be emphasized. First, the data do not permit matching of 
transfer givers with transfer recipients. Second, while the theory is cast in 
terms of lifetime wealth, we are forced to use crude proxies for wealth in 
the empirical implementation. 
Despite these limitations, the data provide qualified support for a model 
of interfamily transfers characterized by altruism in consumption. Inter 
vivos transfers tend to originate in older, high-income family units and are 
primarily targeted towards younger, single individuals. A positive female- 
male differential exists with respect  to transfers.  Interfamily transfers 
tend to narrow relative income inequality. 
The data, however, do not provide the theoretical model with an entirely 
clean bill of health. Financial income is positively related to transfers re- 
ceived, and evidence for the relationship between earnings and transfers 
received is mixed. Indeed, the model predicts a dollar-for-dollar inverse 
relationship between income and transfers, and this hypothesis is clearly 
rejected by the data. 
Despite some of the limitations of this study, we tentatively conclude 
that the direct examination of inter vivos transfers afforded by the PCPP 
data reinforces a solicitous view of the role of these transfers. This initial 
exploration generally supports the view that such interfamily transfers are 
substantial, altruistic, and egalitarian in direction. 
Appendix 
Interfamily Transfer Data 
The PCPP survey respondents were asked questions about interfamily 
transfers in the  following way.  First,  the respondents were reminded 
about the definition of the family unit. The person taking the survey be- 
gan the section on interfamily transfers with the following statement: 
“NOW  I would like to talk about contributions toward your family ex- 
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that your family only includes you [and if appropriate], your husband/ 
wife,  and  any  children  under  eighteen-years-old who  usually live  at 
home.” 
Second, individuals were asked to report monthly transfers received 
(four categories), transfers received over the previous eight months (ten 
categories), and transfers given over the previous eight months (nine cate- 
gories). An example of a question about monthly transfer receipts taken 
from the survey is the following: “Has anyone outside your family made 
contributions  toward  your  mortgage  payments  or  rent  in  the  past 
month?” The respondent was then asked to report the number of people 
from whom he/she received such transfers, the relationship of the donors 
to him/her (e.g., father, sister), and the amounts contributed by each per- 
son. For recipients with multiple donors, the direction of the transfer is 
determined by the generation of the donor who gives the most. 
An example of a question dealing with eight-month transfers received is 
the following: “Since January 1, 1979 has your family received any contri- 
butions  toward college education expenses from anyone outside your 
family?” The survey was taken in August 1979, so this question covers an 
eight-month period. The respondent was then asked to report generations 
of donors and transfer amounts in the same way as was done with monthly 
categories. 
Finally, the survey respondents were asked to report on transfers given. 
An example of a survey question for transfers given is the following: 
“Since January 1, 1979 has your family contributed to bill payments for 
such things as medical, dental and legal fees, vacations, clothes, and so 
on, to anyone outside your family?” Donors were asked to report the 
number of recipients, the relationship of each recipient to them, and the 
transfer amounts given. 
Other data sets dealing with inter vivos interfamily transfers of income 
exist (see, for example, Lampman and Smeeding 1983). Differences in 
variable definitions and organization exist between the PCPP data set and 
others, however, so that ad hoc comparisons between the PCPP data set 
and others would not be very illuminating. The ultimate reliability of the 
interfamily transfers depends on the accuracy with which family units re- 
sponded to the survey and their level of understanding of the survey ques- 
tions. While this is a problem that affects most other data sets based on 
household surveys, the problem of survey response error is likely to be 
particularly acute for the PCPP survey. Survey respondents may be likely 
to overestimate their generosity and underestimate their dependence on 
other family units. The average value reported for durables given, for ex- 
ample, was much higher than the average value reported for durables re- 
ceived (tables 13.3 and 13.4). In addition, the PCPP survey was time con- 
suming and complex. Respondents were asked a long list of questions 
dealing with their balance sheets, pension programs, earnings, other in- 420  Donald Cox/Fkedric Raines 
come, and demographic information. These observations suggest that the 
data for interfamily transfers in the PCPP survey must be interpreted 
with care. 
Respondent Selection 
Sampling and interviews were conducted by Market Facts, Incorporated. 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) created the data tapes from the survey 
results. An original random sample of  6,384 dwelling units was selected, 
and this sample was designed to reflect a cross-section of the U.S. popula- 
tion. Of the 6.384 dwelling units, 829 (13 percent) were either vacant or 
not accessible. Of the remaining 5,555 dwelling units, 1,974 (35.5 percent) 
refused to participate in the survey. The remaining dwelling units con- 
tained data for 3,581 primary units and 1,172 secondary units. A portion 
of these units were judged by Market Facts to be unusable, leaving a final 
sample of 4,605 family units (3,440 primary family units and 1,165 secon- 
dary family units). 
Imputations 
Some of  the values for interfamily transfers were imputed by SRI. Of 
the 728 family units reporting that they gave an interfamily transfer, 64 
were unable to report the amount given for one or more transfer categor- 
ies. Amounts given were imputed by SRI from a regression on income and 
demographic  variables  for  those  reporting  amounts  given  (estimated 
equation not available in the documentation). Of the 840 family units re- 
porting that they received an interfamily transfer, 141 were unable to re- 
port amounts received for one or more of the transfer categories. SRI im- 
puted  amounts  received  for  these  observations  by  using  the  same 
imputation method for amounts given. 
In addition, a portion of  the families indicating asset holdings in var- 
ious categories did not report values for those assets. Of the 2,812 families 
reporting that they had balances in savings accounts, for example, 185 did 
not report the value of these assets. SRI imputed values for these variables 
using methods similar to those used for imputing interfamily transfers. 
However, SRI also included a wealth variable in the data set (  WEALTHQ) 
which was constructed only from nonimputed values for assets. 
To check whether or not the results reported above were sensitive to 
these imputations, equations  (12) and (13) were  reestimated  with two 
modifications.  First, those observations with imputed values for inter- 
family transfers were deleted from the sample. Second, WEALTHQ was 
substituted for the asset and debt variables in the estimating equations. 
The results were similar to those reported in tables  13.12 and  13.13. In 
particular  the elasticity of  transfers given with respect to WEALTHQ 
(evaluated among givers) in the reestimated equation is -17. In compari- 
son, estimated transfer elasticities with respect to FINASST and TANASST 421  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
from table 13.11 above are .16 and .19 respectively. In addition, income 
elasticities of transfers given and received in the reestimated equations 
were similar to those reported in tables 13.12 and 13.13, cols. (1) and (2). 
The estimated income elasticity of transfers given in the reestimated equa- 
tion was 0.98 compared to 0.82 in the equation presented in table 13.12. 
The elasticity of transfers received with respect to income was -  0.20 in 
the reestimated equation compared to -  0.14 in the equation presented in 
table 13.13, cols. (1) and (2). 
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Comment  Paul L. Menchik 
In recent years a number of economists have tried to find the determinants 
and economic effects of  private transfers. In the past the focus has been 
on charitable contributions of time and money, and on bequests. Very lit- 
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tle work has been done on inter vivos transfers-gifts  between living peo- 
ple-presumably  due to the lack of data. The chapter by Cox and Raines, 
which focuses on this issue, is an especially useful start at filling this gap in 
the literature. 
The chapter employs a sample from the President’s Commission on 
Pension Policy-Household  Survey of 4,605 respondents. Although the 
survey was plagued by problems of  nonresponse  (in  13  percent of the 
dwelling units selected a respondent could not be located, and in 35 per- 
cent of  the remaining dwelling units no respondent would participate in 
the survey), this survey represents one of the few available data sets con- 
taining figures on inter vivos transfers. The chapter first presents some de- 
scriptive statistics about those who give and those who receive, then pro- 
vides an analytical model of  the process of transfer from (largely) parent 
to child,  and finally offers some econometric results in support of  the 
model. I will discuss the chapter in the same order. 
The  PCPP survey  obtained  data  from  4,605  families  concerning 
sources of income, savings, and public and private transfers-gifts  as well 
as inheritance received. The survey period  is  the first eight months of 
1979. Respondents were asked if they made or received any contributions 
toward their expenses from outside their immediate family, which is de- 
fined as parents and any children under the age of eighteen living at the 
same  address.  Unfortunately  the  only  identification  of  the  recipient 
(source) of the transfer (except for a very nonrandom subsample) is the 
generation of the party, whether older, younger, or equal. Also transfers 
to those under eighteen and transfers to  spouses were not counted. 
Over the eight-month survey period 15.8 percent of the families report 
giving and 18.3 percent report receiving one or more transfers. Of these 
people about one-quarter report both giving and receiving a transfer. 
The size distribution of transfers is rather concentrated over this short 
period, i.e., over half the transfers received (and given) were received (or 
given) by the highest 10 percent in the recipient (or giver) distribution. 
There is some evidence that transfers received might be underreported 
relative to transfers given (it is better to report giving than receiving)-a 
result also found by James Morgan (1984). It appears that while most 
transfers flow to younger generations, 27 percent go to the same genera- 
tion and only 9 percent are given to older generations. 
If we compare those who make a transfer with those who receive one we 
see the givers are older, wealthier, less likely to be female heads, more likely 
to have labor earnings, and more likely to have higher earnings over the 
eight-month survey period. Also, the group labeled “others” (nongivers 
and nonrecipients) are older than the recipients. “Others” are more likely 
to be retired and to have earnings slightly higher than the recipients and 
lower than givers. What struck me was that although the recipients were 
younger and had lower current earnings than the givers, they were more 423  Interfamily Transfers and Income Redistribution 
like the givers than the “others”  in several significant ways-years  of 
schooling, expected inheritance, and percentage with financial income. 
Although the authors want to conclude that private transfers are egalitar- 
ian, the fact that the transfers go from the well schooled to the well 
schooled, from the wealthy to those expecting three times the inheritance 
of the “others” supports a different hypothesis. That is, transfers may go 
to those whose transitory income is low relative to life cycle and/or per- 
manent income. That transfers are equalizing only in the narrow sense 
that they smooth instabilities out or allow consumption earlier in the life 
cycle than warranted by earnings alone (the way a well-functioning  capital 
market would) is also an allowable inference from this evidence. Further- 
more, that about one-fourth of those either giving or receiving did both 
supports the view of transfers as instability reducing as opposed to life- 
time inequality reducing. 
Using the variance of log income as a measure of inequality,  the authors 
calculate the measure for those making a transfer, with the value of the 
transfer either added to or subtracted from income, then excluded. The 
measure is lower post- than it is pretransfer.  Second, they compute the 
measure for recipients; once again the measure is lower (much lower) 
post- than pretransfer. Finally they compute the measure for all givers and 
recipients and for the entire sample including “others.” As before, the 
measure post implies less inequality then the measure pre. Although the 
authors interpret this to mean that transfers reduce relative income in- 
equality, some comments are in order. 
First, the authors deduct or add the asset value of the transfer from the 
flow of  labor earnings (or total income), not from the flow equivalent. If 
one transfers an asset to another, does it make sense to call earnings-plus 
or minus the asset-net  labor earnings? (This problem is avoided by using 
the flow equivalent of the transfer as was done for inheritance received.) 
This makes sense if the flow is permanent, but with so many people both 
making and  receiving transfers, can this assumption be expected to hold? 
Second, since the income measure is based on transitory income (eight 
months),  the transfers may equalize only in the sense that bank loans 
equalize, e.g.,  reducing instability not permanent inequality of income. 
Finally, the transfers may not reduce lifetime inequality but (as the model 
in the next section reveals) allow consumption earlier in the life cycle than 
current earnings allow. Hence transfers to those early in their life cycle 
may appear to equalize income because recipients are in their relatively 
lower earning years, but may do the contrary. 
The authors present an optimal control model of an overlapping gen- 
eration world. Each person has a child phase and then a parent phase, 
with parents and children coexisting in time. A joint utility function is 
maximized with B-the  weight put on  log child relative to log parent con- 
sumption during the half-life when they both are alive. This specification 424  Donald Cox/Fredric Raines 
of the utility function differs from the standard intergenerational model 
where the lifetime (not half-life) consumption or utility of parent  and 
child is in the maximand. 
The growth path of  earnings is exogeneous, and, most critically, chil- 
dren can neither borrow nor lend. The behavior is referred to as “altruis- 
tic,” but this means only that joint utility maximization is pursued; a B of 
zero (which is allowed by the model) implies that children will starve for 
the benefit of their parents. Their model predicts that the ratio of child-to- 
parent consumption, at any point of time, is B. The comparative static re- 
sults-equation  (10)-predicts  transfers positively related to the wealths 
of parents and children and negatively related to the child’s current earn- 
ings. However, wealth is defined as the discounted sum of earnings over 
the period. Hence for a given growth rate in earnings one cannot take the 
partial derivative of wealth, holding earnings constant; if  one moves, the 
other must move as required by the identity defining wealth. 
The point of the model, which is a valuable one, is that if children can 
neither borrow nor lend, i.e., are totally constrained by current earnings, 
their parents act as the bank allowing a child with growing earnings to 
consume more than current earnings warrant. Children are therefore able 
to get around this capital constraint by “banking” with their parents like a 
child actor might. Whether this severe constraint for children is of suffi- 
cient importance to explain all transfers is another matter. Note that the 
model differs from other  “altruistic”  models in the literature that base 
transfers on differences in lifetime (not half-life) resources or consump- 
tion between generations.  Hence it is by  no means clear that transfers 
equalize lifetime consumption,  but rather  half-life consumption.  With 
secularly growing earnings this mechanism would likely dis-equalize life- 
time income since parents would be transferring resources to a younger 
cohort that is poorer during the period of overlap, but richer than they 
over a lifetime accounting period. 
The authors estimate Tobit models of transfers made and transfers re- 
ceived. They use the data set of 4,605 family units divided into primary 
and secondary, with (I think) the presence of  the marital couple denoting 
primary and single individuals as secondary when all live at the same ad- 
dress. (It’s not clear what is done when two married couples live together.) 
A Tobit regression of transfers made is presented in table 13.11 as a func- 
tion of eighteen variables. Transfers received is positively related to tran- 
sitory income with an elasticity of .82. Martin David and I (Menchik and 
David 1983) found that the earnings elasticity of bequests made could not 
be represented by a constant, with a markedly higher elasticity at higher 
rather than lower income.  I would like to see if, for example, using a 
spline function, the same is true for gifts. 
They also find that gifts made vary directly with assets but, interestingly, 
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strategy of giving away one’s low yielding but greatly appreciated assets 
for tax purposes. Since the taxable basis is not stepped up for gifts, but is 
for bequests, it is certainly cheaper to give an appreciated asset rather than 
cash to someone in a lower tax bracket. Hence this behavior is consistent 
with tax avoidance. The results also show a positive and significant effect 
of education and age (up to age sixty-two) on transfers made. 
Next they present, in table 13.12, regressions of both total transfers (ex- 
cluding inheritance) received and noneducational transfers received. In 
the total equation, transitory income is used; in the second, wage rates are 
used as measures of the recipients’ current position. First, years of educa- 
tion is a positive determinant of transfers received in both equations. Sec- 
ond, current income has a negative sign in the first equation which the au- 
thors claim supports an egalitarian view.  (The authors note that since 
those currently attending school would have a low labor supply, this find- 
ing might be a spurious one.) In the second equation, noneducational 
transfers are regressed on wage rate not income. The sign is negative and 
insignificant for heads and positive and insignificant for spouses, which is 
counter to the model. It seems to me that the regressors were entered in a 
backwards fashion-that  wage rate should be in the first and income in 
the second regression if the time cost of being a student is to be adjusted 
for. Transfers received rise with age and expected inheritance. 
Finally, regressions for family units sharing living quarters are presented. 
The results are mixed on the sign of  own income-positive  for secondary 
units and negative for primary units. 
The chapter is a start at filling an important gap in the literture. I would 
quibble with the authors’ conclusion that the results supported an “altru- 
istic, egalitarian” view of transfers. Transfers are made from and to well- 
educated people and (as in the model) can be used to get around an imper- 
fect capital market, but may not be equalizing in a lifetime sense. Hence I 
would argue that the results more strongly support a “shock absorber” or 
“young Rockefeller”  model rather than an equalizing or compensating 
one. Without data on lifetime earnings, their case cannot be made. 
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